[LAC-TF] Fwd: NetBSD Security Advisory 2018-004: Remote Memory Corruption in IPv6

Fernando Gont fgont at si6networks.com
Tue Feb 13 07:12:16 BRST 2018


A esto hago referencia cuando hablo de la madurez de las
implementaciones IPv6.

-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: NetBSD Security Advisory 2018-004: Remote Memory Corruption in IPv6
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2018 20:11:48 -0500
From: NetBSD Security-Officer <security-officer at netbsd.org>
Reply-To: NetBSD Security Officer <security-officer at NetBSD.org>
To: tech-security at NetBSD.org

		NetBSD Security Advisory 2018-004

Topic:		Remote Memory Corruption in IPv6

Version:	NetBSD-current:		source prior to Tue, Jan 30th 2018
		NetBSD 7.1:		affected
		NetBSD 7.0 - 7.0.2:	affected
		NetBSD 6.1 - 6.1.4:	affected
		NetBSD 6.0 - 6.0.5:	affected

Severity:	Remote DoS, Remote Memory Corruption

Fixed:		NetBSD-current:		Tue, Jan 30th 2018
		NetBSD-7-1 branch:	Tue, Jan 30th 2018
		NetBSD-7-0 branch:	Tue, Jan 30th 2018
		NetBSD-7 branch:	Tue, Jan 30th 2018
		NetBSD-6-1 branch:	Tue, Jan 30th 2018
		NetBSD-6-0 branch:	Tue, Jan 30th 2018
		NetBSD-6 branch:	Tue, Jan 30th 2018

Teeny versions released later than the fix date will contain the fix.

Please note that NetBSD releases prior to 6.0 are no longer supported.
It is recommended that all users upgrade to a supported release.


A mistake in the way received IPv6 packets are handled allowed an attacker
to remotely trigger a memory corruption.

Technical Details

When a packet is received, the kernel stores it in memory as chain of mbufs.
An mbuf is basically a block of contiguous memory.

A function, located deep into the IPv6 entry point, was not performing the
necessary checks when treating a received IPv6 packet. It was parsing the
IPv6 options assuming they were located in the first mbuf of the chain, but
this assumption was incorrect. Therefore, it was possible for this function
to return a pointer that pointed to an area located after the first mbuf.

This pointer was then either read from, or written to with one byte that
could be controlled by the packet.

It has been demonstrated that by sending a special combination of nested
IPv6 fragments, this bug could be exploited remotely, and could allow an
attacker to cause the kernel to behave unexpectedly because random areas of
memory were overwritten. It is not clear whether this attack could be turned
to a code execution attack.

The PF firewall can mitigate this particular attack, because it rejects
nested IPv6 fragments by default. NPF does not reject such fragments by
default. The status of IPF in this regard has not been investigated. It is
possible that other vectors than IPv6 fragments could trigger this

Solutions and Workarounds

For all NetBSD versions, you need to obtain fixed kernel sources,
rebuild and install the new kernel, and reboot the system.

The fixed source may be obtained from the NetBSD CVS repository.
The following instructions briefly summarize how to upgrade your
kernel. In these instructions, replace:

  ARCH     with your architecture (from uname -m),
  KERNCONF with the name of your kernel configuration file and
  VERSION  with the file version below

File versions containing the fixes:

 FILE     HEAD     netbsd-7     netbsd-7-0     netbsd-7-1
 ----     ----     --------     ----------     ----------

 FILE              netbsd-6     netbsd-6-0     netbsd-6-1
 ----              --------     ----------     ----------

Note: for NetBSD-6, there are three more files that contain the fix.

To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install the kernel:

	# cd src
	# cvs update -d -P -r VERSION sys/netinet6/frag6.c
	# cvs update -d -P -r VERSION sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c
	# cvs update -d -P -r VERSION sys/netinet6/ip6_var.h
	# cvs update -d -P -r VERSION sys/netinet6/raw_ip6.c

If you run NetBSD-6:
	# cvs update -d -P -r VERSION sys/netinet6/ah_input.c
	# cvs update -d -P -r VERSION sys/netinet6/esp_input.c
	# cvs update -d -P -r VERSION sys/netinet6/ipcomp_input.c

	# ./build.sh kernel=KERNCONF
	# mv /netbsd /netbsd.old
	# cp sys/arch/ARCH/compile/obj/KERNCONF/netbsd /netbsd
	# shutdown -r now

For more information on how to do this, see:


Thanks To

Maxime Villard for finding and fixing the issue.

Revision History

	2018-02-12	Initial release

More Information

Advisories may be updated as new information becomes available.
The most recent version of this advisory (PGP signed) can be found at


Information about NetBSD and NetBSD security can be found at
http://www.NetBSD.org/ and http://www.NetBSD.org/Security/ .

Copyright 2018, The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.  All Rights Reserved.
Redistribution permitted only in full, unmodified form.

Fernando Gont
e-mail: fernando at gont.com.ar || fgont at si6networks.com
PGP Fingerprint: 7809 84F5 322E 45C7 F1C9 3945 96EE A9EF D076 FFF1

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