[lacnog] RV: NWW: Fix to Chinese Internet traffic hijack due in January

[alvaro.sanchez en adinet.com.uy]

Otro enfoque.

----Mensaje original----
De: woody en pch.net
Fecha: 08/12/2010 16:23 
Para: "NANOG list"<nanog en nanog.org>
Asunto: Re: NWW: Fix to Chinese Internet traffic hijack due in 
January 


On Dec 8, 2010, at 10:13 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> http://www.networkworld.com/cgi-bin/mailto/x.cgi?
pagetosend=/news/2010/120710-chinese-internet-traffic-fix.
html&pagename=/news/2010/120710-chinese-internet-traffic-fix.
html&pageurl=http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/120710-chinese-
internet-traffic-fix.html&site=printpage&nsdr=n
> Fix to Chinese Internet traffic hijack due in January

FWIW, I was fairly unhappy with how PCH was portrayed in the 
article...  That was the product of a very long interview, and we 
certainly didn't suggest that the Prefix Sanity Checker was an 
_alternative_ to RPKI.  I very much think routing security is a 
critical issue, the Prefix Sanity Checker was a baby-step in that 
direction, which will help some people some of the time; tools that 
perform a cryptographic verification of RADb-style origin and 
transitive-path assertions are the obvious next step, and I'd very much 
like to see them developed.  It does seem to me, and a lot of people 
who've talked with me about it, however, that using existing 
cryptographic methods on top of existing routing-policy methods, would 
get us further, faster, than trying to cook up some whole new single-
purpose protocol from scratch.  That was the essence of the interview I 
gave, and I don't think that message made it through into the finished 
article very obviously.

                                -Bill






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