[lacnog] DDoS, ataques de amplificacion y BCP38

[Carlos M. Martinez]

El tema de los open resolvers es increible... como algo tan facil de
corregir es completamente ignorado por la gente.

¿Que nos pasa?

s2

~C.

On 3/27/13 5:23 PM, Hugo Salgado wrote:
> Además, cerrar los DNS recursivos solo a los clientes; y aplicar
> RRL a los autoritativos.
>
> Saludos,
>
> Hugo
>
> On 03/27/2013 05:16 PM, Arturo Servin wrote:
>> 	Hay una discusion interesante sobre DDoS, ataques de amplificacion y
>> BCP38 en la lista de nanog.
>>
>> 	De ahi este par de articulos (sobre DDoS de mas de 100 Gbps) que nos
>> dice lo importante de aplicar el BCP38 a nuestras redes:
>>
>> New York Times
>> http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/technology/internet/online-dispute-becomes-internet-snarling-attack.html
>>
>> http://blog.cloudflare.com/the-ddos-that-almost-broke-the-internet
>>
>>
>> 	Espero que en estas listas la mayoria se asegure que el trafico que
>> sale de sus redes y de sus clientes no sea de direcciones de IP "spoofeadas"
>>
>> Extracto del articulo del NY Times:
>>
>> "The heart of the problem, according to several Internet engineers, is
>> that many large Internet service providers have not set up their
>> networks to make sure that traffic leaving their networks is actually
>> coming from their own users. The potential security flaw has long been
>> known by Internet security specialists, but it has only recently been
>> exploited in a way that threatens the Internet infrastructure."
>>
>> Slds
>> as
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