[lacnog] Bogon route objects in the LACNIC IRR

Sergio Rojas. . . sergio.astigarraga en gmail.com
Mie Ago 18 12:14:38 -03 2021


Personally, I think the LACNIC IRR implementation is a technology 
innovation, facilitating the work of resources holders the maintenance 
of the route registries. In that way, if you change you routing table, 
you don´t need to update in two different platform, so +1 for this 

I recognize the work you have done, specially because most of the 
community still using IRR DBs, but now a day the most reliable and safe 
tool to trust on routing table is RPKI.  Sooner or later IRR DBs will be 
obsolete and I think your researching work should be focus on RPKI 

	>Or alternatively LACNIC staff could see the problem, could recognize and
	>admit that these ROAs should never have been allowed to be created in the
	>first place, and could simply delete them.

I invite you to read RPKI documentation and get deep knowledge about how 
it works before accuse the RIR that made a mistake. As far as I know, 
the MiLacnic portal alert to resources holders if there is a mistake on 
a certain ROA, so the resources holders is completely responsible for 
updating/fixing the mistake, not the RIR.


Sergio. . .

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instead  unfounded accusations.
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El 18/8/21 a las 04:17, Ronald F. Guilmette escribió:
> In message <a13a4bf8-1d55-5620-8079-0f87bc8747a6 en gmail.com>,
> "Sergio Rojas. . ." <sergio.astigarraga en gmail.com> wrote:
>> What Job want to say is that each object created in the LACNIC´s IRR
>> database is generated automatically from the created ROAs in the RPKI
>> platform.
> Thank you for clarifying.  This was sort-of what I had inferred from
> Job's posting, however I wanted to make sure that I had understood
> correctly.  Now I believe that I do.  So thanks for that.
>> Using the analogy described in your e-mail, in order to clean the weeds,
>> it will be necessary that resource holders of these 20 objects you have
>> found, revoke invalid ROAs from MiLacnic portal. Once revoked, weeds in
>> the IRR database will be cleaned automatically.
> Or alternatively LACNIC staff could see the problem, could recognize and
> admit that these ROAs should never have been allowed to be created in the
> first place, and could simply delete them.
> That would be the sensible thing to do, in my opinion.  If your dog makes
> a mess on your carpet, do you convene an international panel of experts
> to decide what to do about that?  Do you wait until you have developed
> a formal community-approved policy before you remove the stinky steaming
> pile from your carpet?  No, of course not.
> The twenty route objects that I identified and listed here are provably
> bogus.  And yet when I raised the issue of such "bogon" route objects
> previously, in private emails with certain LACNIC officials, I was
> informed that no action would be taken by LACNIC in relation to such
> bogon route objects the absence of a formal, community-approved policy
> which explicitly granted LACNIC staff permission to clean up this specific
> kind of dog droppings.
> I personally do not feel that such a level of fastidious formality either
> is or should be required.  Other RIRs (not LACNIC) have apparentlty agreed
> with my view on this point, and have already cleaned up much or all of their
> provably improper published route objects.
> That having been said, going back to Job's point about the system for
> creating RPKI ROAs I would like to just make this one point:
> Although Job is quite certainly and undoubtedly correct in what he has
> said about the results of the deliberations that resulted in the overall
> design of that system, and specifically about how that system explicitly
> allows people to use invalid "bogon" ASNs, I am not at all persuaded
> that this was in any sense a good design choice *or* that it should now
> act as a constraint, preventing garbage "bogon" route objects from being
> deleted by any RIR.
> Job is correct that each individual RIR can, in general, only look to
> its own internal records to see what has been validly allocated and
> what has not been validly allocated.  It is perhaps a reasonable point
> of view that the internal records of each RIR are the only things that
> each of them can fully trust, *however* I see no reason why they either
> cannot or should not trust the daily "stats" files that are generated
> by their various brethern, nor do I believe that these files cannot be
> published and transferred among and between the various RIRs in a safe
> and secure manner.
> In short there exists *no* technical impediment which would prevent any
> RIR from fully checking *any* proposed new route *before* it is either
> accepted as part of the RPKI system *or* as part of the older and non-
> cryptographic predecessor system, under which the RIRs simply publish plain
> text route objects with no fancy cryptographics attached.  Either way,
> it is perfectly possible, as I have demonstrated, to fully check any
> given proposed new route in order to insure that it refers only to
> valid assigned IP space *and* only to valid assigned AS numbers.  The
> fact that this can be done easly and in a way that spans the entire
> globe should now be apparent and obvious to all, so there is no real
> exuse anymore for any of the RIRs to be doing only a half-hearted job
> in checking for the full validity of routes before they authoritatively
> publish them to the entire world, either via RPKI ROAs, or otherwise.
> Regards,
> rfg
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