[lacnog] ¿¿ 8.8.8.0/24 secuestrado en Venezuela ??

[Doug Madory]

That's correct. AS7908's upstream providers filtered the route, but probably just due to its size. They are currently letting them globally announce China Telecom address space, so I wouldn't give those upstream providers (Sprint and Telefonica de Argentina*) too much credit for their route filters. ;-)

In the few cases that it propagated, it went through peering links, which are much less likely to be filtered from my experience looking at the impacts of routing leaks.

* Level 3 is also a provider of BT Latam, but doesn't transit 125.125.125.0/24. Perhaps AS7908 doesn't announce it to them, or perhaps AS3356 is filtering it.

Doug Madory
603-643-9300 x115
Hanover, NH
"The Internet Intelligence Authority"

On Mar 19, 2014, at 5:22 PM, lacnog-request en lacnic.net wrote:

> Message: 4
> Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2014 18:21:54 -0300
> From: "Carlos M. Martinez" <carlosmarcelomartinez en gmail.com>
> To: Latin America and Caribbean Region Network Operators Group
> 	<lacnog en lacnic.net>
> Subject: Re: [lacnog] ¿¿ 8.8.8.0/24 secuestrado en Venezuela ??
> Message-ID: <532A0A72.9020306 en gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> 
> According to what I take from Doug's answer, the only two differences
> between this case and that of Pakistan Telecom and YouTube are that (1)
> the 'mistakenly leaked' (let's not call it hijacking :-) ) prefix was a
> /32 instead of a /24, and (2) that BT Latam upstreams apparently do a
> much better job at prefix filtering than what PCCW did for PakTel.
> 
> Other than that, it's the same old story all over again. So yes, RPKI
> could have played a useful role here.
> 
> 
> Cheers!
> 
> ~Carlos