[lacnog] ¿¿ 8.8.8.0/24 secuestrado en Venezuela ??

[Carlos M. Martinez]

At least they don't propagate /32s :-)

On 3/19/14, 6:34 PM, Doug Madory wrote:
> That's correct. AS7908's upstream providers filtered the route, but probably just due to its size. They are currently letting them globally announce China Telecom address space, so I wouldn't give those upstream providers (Sprint and Telefonica de Argentina*) too much credit for their route filters. ;-)
>
> In the few cases that it propagated, it went through peering links, which are much less likely to be filtered from my experience looking at the impacts of routing leaks.
>
> * Level 3 is also a provider of BT Latam, but doesn't transit 125.125.125.0/24. Perhaps AS7908 doesn't announce it to them, or perhaps AS3356 is filtering it.
>
> Doug Madory
> 603-643-9300 x115
> Hanover, NH
> "The Internet Intelligence Authority"
>
> On Mar 19, 2014, at 5:22 PM, lacnog-request en lacnic.net wrote:
>
>> Message: 4
>> Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2014 18:21:54 -0300
>> From: "Carlos M. Martinez" <carlosmarcelomartinez en gmail.com>
>> To: Latin America and Caribbean Region Network Operators Group
>> 	<lacnog en lacnic.net>
>> Subject: Re: [lacnog] ¿¿ 8.8.8.0/24 secuestrado en Venezuela ??
>> Message-ID: <532A0A72.9020306 en gmail.com>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>>
>> According to what I take from Doug's answer, the only two differences
>> between this case and that of Pakistan Telecom and YouTube are that (1)
>> the 'mistakenly leaked' (let's not call it hijacking :-) ) prefix was a
>> /32 instead of a /24, and (2) that BT Latam upstreams apparently do a
>> much better job at prefix filtering than what PCCW did for PakTel.
>>
>> Other than that, it's the same old story all over again. So yes, RPKI
>> could have played a useful role here.
>>
>>
>> Cheers!
>>
>> ~Carlos