[lacnog] Fwd: [ksk-rollover] Update on root KSK roll project for December 2017

Carlos M. Martinez carlosm3011 en gmail.com
Lun Dic 18 17:47:33 BRST 2017


vamos a tener que esperar un poquito mas.



Forwarded message:

> From: Matt Larson <matt.larson en icann.org>
> To: ksk-rollover en icann.org
> Subject: [ksk-rollover] Update on root KSK roll project for December 
> 2017
> Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2017 19:44:17 +0000
> Dear colleagues,
> I just posted an update on the root KSK roll project at 
> https://www.icann.org/news/blog/update-on-the-root-ksk-rollover-project. 
> The text is reproduced below for your convenience and please let me 
> offer the customary apology if you receive duplicate postings of this 
> message on multiple mailing lists.
> Matt
> --
> Matt Larson <matt.larson en icann.org>
> VP of Research, Office of the CTO, ICANN
> The ICANN org is today announcing that it will not roll the root zone 
> KSK in the first quarter of 2018.
> We have decided that we do not yet have enough information to set a 
> specific date for the rollover. We want to make clear, however, that 
> the ICANN org is committed to rolling the root zone KSK and we will 
> continue to discuss this important process with the community, gather 
> their feedback and give all interested parties advance notice of at 
> least one calendar quarter when we set the date for the rollover.
> Furthermore, we are soliciting input from the community to help 
> determine, if possible, appropriate objective criteria to measure the 
> possible negative impact of the root KSK rollover on Internet users, 
> and acceptable values for those criteria before a rollover. This is in 
> accordance with the bottom-up, multi-stakeholder model that has been 
> so successful for ICANN policy development.
> On 27 September 2017, the ICANN org announced it was postponing the 
> root zone KSK rollover for at least one quarter, leaving open the 
> possibility the root KSK rollover might occur in the first quarter of 
> 2018. We have since realized that our analysis and preparation will 
> require additional time.
> In a previous post, we described our analysis of recursive resolver 
> trust anchor configuration information reported using the protocol 
> defined in RFC 8145, Signaling Trust Anchor Knowledge in DNS 
> SecurityExtensions (DNSSEC). Our analysis revealed that about 4% of 
> the approximately 12,000 DNSSEC-validating resolvers reporting during 
> the month of September 2017 were configured with only KSK-2010 (the 
> shorthand for the current root KSK) and would have been unable to 
> resolve DNS queries after the rollover occurred.
> The ICANN org's decision to postpone the rollover was based on the 
> concern that we did not understand why those resolvers were not 
> properly configured, and we needed time to investigate.
> Since then, we have attempted to contact the operators of 500 
> addresses that had reported a resolver configuration with only 
> KSK-2010 instead of the correct configuration of both KSK-2010 and the 
> new KSK, KSK-2017. Ideally, that investigation would have revealed a 
> set of clear causes for the improper configuration, allowing further 
> communication and actions to be targeted at addressing those specific 
> issues. But in the end, the analysis was not as conclusive as we would 
> have hoped.
> In our initial attempt, we received a response from operators of 
> approximately 20% of the 500 addresses. Of those addresses whose 
> operators we could contact, 60% came from address ranges known to host 
> devices with dynamic addresses, such as routers of home broadband 
> users and ephemeral virtual machines, making these resolvers extremely 
> difficult (if not impossible) to track down. About 25% of the 
> addresses corresponded to a resolver forwarding on behalf of another 
> resolver that was reporting only KSK-2010. Since the address of the 
> device reporting the incorrect configuration was not the actual source 
> resolver, it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to identify 
> the true source address of the resolver that was reporting only 
> KSK-2010.
> To proceed with the root KSK rollover, the ICANN org must have 
> confidence that the rollover will not have an unacceptable negative 
> impact on Internet users. The challenge we have encountered since we 
> began to analyze the RFC 8145 trust anchor configuration reports from 
> resolvers is assessing the impact on users.
> We can make a number of assumptions: for example, it is unlikely that 
> a recursive resolver running at a dynamic address could support a 
> large number of users since it does not offer a stable address for any 
> devices to send queries to for resolution. But ultimately, determining 
> potential user impact based on the data available to us is difficult 
> and we are therefore soliciting the community's input.
> Input and discussion on acceptable criteria for proceeding with the 
> KSK roll will take place on an existing email list that is already 
> being used for discussion of the root KSK rollover. We encourage 
> anyone interested in contributing to join the mailing list by visiting 
> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ksk-rollover.
> The ICANN org will monitor this mailing list and beginning on 15 
> January 2018, we will develop a draft plan for proceeding with the 
> root KSK roll based on the input received and discussion on the 
> mailing list. The plan will be published by 31 January 2018 and 
> undergo a formal ICANN public comment process to gather further input. 
> We will hold a session at ICANN61 in San Juan, Puerto Rico, to discuss 
> the plan and hear from the community in person. Our intent is to have 
> a revised plan available for community review and public comment prior 
> to ICANN62 in Panama City, Panama, with a final plan published soon 
> thereafter.
> Throughout the process we'll continue to keep the community updated on 
> the root KSK rollover project's progress.
> _______________________________________________
> ksk-rollover mailing list
> ksk-rollover en icann.org
> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ksk-rollover

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