[LACNIC/Politicas] Los secuestros BGP constituyen una violación de las políticas - LAC-2019-5

Arturo Servin arturo.servin at gmail.com
Fri Apr 12 07:25:59 -03 2019

> Let's go back to the Pakistan Telecom/Google case...
> The correct way of doing a ban to Google services for users within
> Pakistan would have been filtering. Instead by hijacking Google's routes,
> the communication between Google and networks in other countries was also
> affected.
> My point is:
> No rule in place -- fine, we can go with hijacking or filtering to
> accomplish the govt/court order.
> Rule in place -- hijacking is not admissible, we need to use filtering.
> Unfortunately there wasn't a rule in place, so Pakistan Telecom chose the
> wrong approach :/
First, we do not know for fact what Pakistan Telecom wanted to do. It could
have just a static route or a filter that went wrong.

Second, IMO it is very naive to think that a "rule" in a RIR would avoid a
bad actor to do something bad.

Third, RIR policies are not "rules", neither protocols, domain names, etc.
Those are norms that we chose to follow to guarantee that the Internet
works well. These works because there is a large mass of people deciding to
use. In the moment that most of those decide to use an alternate root, an
alternate IP protocol or an alternate numbers registry we would have a
fractioned Internet and no "rule" or policy would stop that.

Fourth, as said many times. There are places to define some norms, to say
that the use of an number resource is good or bad it is a policy decision
that has no room in the RIRs policy manual as this is for allocation,
assignment and administration of number resources, not its use. Possibly in
another forum, possibly operational, related to law enforcement, Internet
policy, etc. but not here.


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